[continued from parent]

• Things to look at, ways to help Ukrainian forces maintain pressure
  on Russian forces going into winter. Possible that Ukrainian
  military will become exhausted, like last fall. Probably what
  Russian military anticipates, don’t want to let Russia comfortably
  spend time digging in, reconstituting forces. Russia probably going
  to conduct another critical infrastructure strike campaign against
  Ukrainian cities, trying to make them uninhabitable, destroy viability as
  state. That means that air defense is going to become a priority
  again. Russia’s strategic campaign did not succeed last year, but
  situation in December was somewhat-precarious. Ukrainian air
  defenses have gotten much better, gotten more equipment from West.
  Not clear whether this is going to be a cold or warm winter.
  Russian offensive potential remains weak in Kofman’s view; without
  significant mobilization, have hard time to regenerate much
  offensive power. Should not discount possibility of additional
  Russian mobilization. Conversations on next year’s offensive needs
  to start now; even if this offensive is successful, likely not to
  liberate extent of territory that Ukraine and western countries had
  hoped. Don’t want to have a last-minute approach next year the way
  we did this year. Need to have commitments for equipment, etc, in
  September, not January. Training efforts are scaling up. Artillery
  ammunition probably going to be biggest constraint. One of biggest
  issues going to be coming up with enough both to let Ukraine sustain
  defenses and also to set aside enough to allow for offensives.
  Russia also increasing production, Russia trying to buy from North
  Korea, Iran. West needs to accept that this is going to be a long
  war and be willing to tolerate that; the opportunities for this to
  be a short war have passed. Russian forces could have collapsed
  last fall or Prighozin’s mutinty have caused a coup or collapse, but
  those didn’t happen. Can’t know yet, but increasingly likely that
  Ukraine will not be able to decisively drive all the way to the
  coast in this offensive. Need to focus conversation on long-term
  outcome of war, long-term investments.

• On Prighozin’s death: Sounds like Prighozin’s final mistake was
  coming back to challenge breakup of Wagner; not clear that he was
  always going to be killed, though Kofman would never have bet much
  on Putin’s deal with Prighozin holding. Happy to see end of
  Prighozin; Western media tended to uncritically quote Prighozin,
  though he is not a reliable source. Wagner as an organization will
  probably continue in some form. Experienced fighters will stay
  around. Probably will be hard to fully replace Wagner, but we will
  see. Wagner may be back. Russian Ministry of Defense is requiring
  that people who want to fight in Ukraine need to take an oath. How
  important was Wagner? Was mostly fighting for Bakhmut, which wasn’t
  really decisive in the conflict. Perhaps Wagner’s main impact was
  in December or January last winter, when Russian military was very
  vulnerable and desperate to stabilize lines.